(1) I agree with Ross's (1999) , central claim: Color vision scientists implicitly accept a certain supervenience thesis of phenomenal properties of visual experience on internally individuated physiological properties of the visual system (I shall come back to the question of how the supervenience claim at issue should be spelled out in detail). He correctly points out that one of the premises that lead to the prediction that pseudonormal people would be red-green inverted is incompatible with a denial of that supervenience thesis. He is also, of course, correct in the following claim: Who accepts a supervenience thesis of the required kind thereby already excludes all those versions of functionalism that embrace some form of what he calls ''phenomenal externalism.'' From these observations Ross seems to conclude that the argument given in my 1996 paper amounts to a petitio principii until it is supplemented with some kind of independent support for the supervenience claim at issue.
If this is what he means, then he may have misunderstood what I intended to show. My aim was, roughly, to show that certain versions of functionalism are incompatible with empirically established predictions of color vision science.
1 The mere fact that there is this conflict should be a problem for functionalists since they typically believe that their claims about the meaning of mental terms reflect the way these terms are actually used in the empirical sciences and/or that their theory about the nature of mental states makes explicit what is implicitly accepted anyway about the nature of mental states in the relevant empirical disciplines. The conflict just mentioned shows that these assumptions are false. In order to establish that there really is this kind of conflict between color vision theory and the philosophical positions at issue, I obviously do not need to embrace, nor do I need to defend, the premises accepted in color vision science that are needed for a deduction of the conflict and I also do not need to embrace or defend the claims implicitly presupposed by these premises.
(2) Once the conflict is established, the philosopher under attack can react in vari-ous ways. One way is to stick with his original position and to criticize the empirical discipline he explicitly contradicts. I agree with Ross that no empirical discipline should be regarded as being beyond philosophical criticism. If a philosophical theory can be shown to contradict the claims of an empirically established theory, this is not a knockdown argument but only a prima facie argument that can be overridden by further considerations. 2 But the philosopher under attack then has the burden of proof on his side. In a case of conflict between a philosophical theory and an empirically established theory the philosopher should be able to show or indicate how the empirical theory could be replaced by a different one, which is (a) compatible with the philosopher's claims, (b) as well established as the original one by the available data, and (c) as rich in its empirical content as the original theory. It certainly does not suffice as an answer to the prima facie argument at issue to show that there are philosophically controversial assumptions implicitly presupposed in the contradicting empirical theory. After all, if this were not so, the conflict could not have occurred in the first place.
(3) Peter Ross's article can in part be read as (a) a diagnosis of the deeper source of the conflict between functionalist theories and color vision science and (b) a contribution to a metatheoretical analysis of color vision science. In drawing our attention to the claim of supervenience of phenomenal properties of experience on internally individuated physiological properties, Ross points to a central presupposition of color vision science which is, I think, of great philosophical interest for the debate about phenomenal consciousness and deserves closer examination. 3 The following questions arise: (a) What is, more exactly, the supervenience thesis implicitly accepted in color vision science? (b) What is the methodological status of that principle? Is it a philosophical assumption or an empirical assumption or both? (c) To what extent is the assumption capable of empirical test and to what extent can it be considered as being already empirically supported? (d) What is the motivation-philosophical or other-for the acceptance of that principle? How could it be justified? I will briefly address questions (a) and (d) in the following.
(4) Supervenience is a relation that obtains between properties of a class A and properties of a class B (''A-properties supervene on B-properties''). What are more precisely the classes A and B at issue in the supervenience thesis implicitly accepted in color vision science? Certainly, color vision scientists believe that there could not be any difference with respect to the hue sensed by different people on given occasions if there were no internally specifiable physiological differences to be detected in their respective visual systems. Therefore, as a first approximation, we may take as class B just the class of physiological properties of the visual system. A closer look at the details, however, quickly reveals that color vision scientists accept a stronger supervenience claim. They quite obviously believe that there can be no difference with respect to the hue unless there is no difference with respect to a certain subclass S of all physiological properties of the visual system, where S does not contain (a) physiological properties of the retina and (b) physiological properties that underly dispositions of linguistic behaviour like, e.g., color naming. That physiological properties of the retina are not included in the subclass S reflects the conviction that these properties cannot directly determine the phenomenal quality of color experience but can do so only via their causal influence on higher regions of the brain. In accordance with this conviction color vision science predicts that green things appear with respect to hue to pseudonormal people like red things appear to normal people, although there are physiological differences to be found on the retina of pseudonormal and normal people on the appropriate occasions (the receptors are filled with different photopigments). That the properties mentioned in (b) are not included in the class S reflects the conviction that the way we talk about colors does not directly determine the phenomenal quality of color experience but only-if at all-via causal influences on other ''lower'' processes involved in color perception. In accordance to this conviction color vision science predicts that red apples would appear green to pseudonormals, although they would call them red.
(5) What are the properties that supervene-according to the supervience thesis implicitly accepted by color vision scientists-on the physiological properties in the class S? According to a first possible answer we get the class of supervening properties if we consider different replacements for C in the schema ''the property of perceiving a specific color C'' (this is the proposal that Ross seems to have in mind). According to another possible answer the class is given by different replacements in the schema ''the property of having a visual experience with a specific phenomenal quality q'' (this is the proposal I would prefer). To see how these two proposals can be different one has to be clear about the fact that color terms play two distinct roles in our language. They are used (a) to ascribe visually detectable properties to concrete objects (e.g., in sentences like ''the rose is red'') and (b) to describe how something appears to a person as in ''the rose appears blue to me under certain light conditions.'' In the second case the color term is used to describe the specific intrinsic phenomenal quality of a given experience. Let us call color terms when used in the first way Ccolor terms and when used in the second c-color terms. Many philosophers have an objectivist theory about C-color terms according to which C-color terms refer to or express objective physical properties of objects (e.g., the property of reflecting light of different wavelengths in a specific way). Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the objectivist theory about C-color terms is acceptable. Then it seems quite obvious that the color perceived by a pseudonormal person when looking at a red tomato is the color red. After all, the pseudonormal person is capable of recognizing red-that specific objective surface property-just by looking. But note that in talking this way, we are not asserting anything about the intrinsic phenomenal quality experienced by the pseudonormal person when seeing a red thing. A pseudonormal person may detect the property red visually and thus-in a sense-see or perceive red by having experiences of green, that is by having experiences of a phenomenal character we refer to using ''green'' as a c-color term. We can concede, for the sake of argument, that one may introduce one sense of the locution ''to perceive red'' as meaning something like ''detecting the objective property red by looking.'' Color perceptions in this sense obviously do not supervene on internally specified physiological properties contained in class S (in the following I call them S-properties): Different internally specified physiological states may be caused by the same objective surface property in different people, as we can see in the case of normal and pseudonormal people. Color vision scientists obviously do not believe or implicitly presuppose that color perceptions in this sense supervene on S-properties. Therefore the class A of supervening properties cannot be given by the schema ''the property of perceiving color C'' if to perceive a color is interpreted in this sense. What really supervenes on S-properties-according to color vision science-are the properties of having an experience of a specific phenomenal character. Now there are philosophers who combine an objectivist view about C-color terms with what one might call an eliminativist view about c-color terms and Peter Ross might be one of them. According to these philosophers, to have an experience of a specific phenomenal character, e.g., the one we normally refer to using the c-term ''red,'' is nothing but perceiving red in the sense of detecting visually the objective property red. But this is an attempt to get rid of intrinsic phenomenal properties of color experience and amounts to a denial of their existence. This is certainly not the view implicitly presupposed in color vision science. Color vision scientists quite obviously implicitly accept a noneliminativist, realist view about intrinsic phenomenal properties of color experience, according to which there may be a real difference in phenomenal quality in the visual experiences of two people (e.g., the first has an experience of red and the second of green), although both see red in the sense of detecting visually the objective surface property that is characteristic for red things. 4 It is interesting to see that there is a successful empirical discipline that has this plausible but under philosophers quite controversial realist view about intrinsic phenomenal qualities incorporated. On a realist view about intrinsic phenomenal properties of color perception, the supervenience of these properties on internally specified physiological properties appears undeniable.
